We develop a theory of the market for individual reputation, an indicator of regard by one's peers and others. The central questions are: 1) Does the quantity of exposures raise reputation independent of their quality? and 2) Assuming that overall quality matters for reputation, does the quality of an individual's most important exposure have an extra effect on reputation? Using evidence for academic economists, we find that, conditional on its impact, the quantity of output has no or even a negative effect on each of a number of proxies for reputation, and very little evidence that a scholar's most influential work provides any extra enhancement of reputation. Quality ranking matters more than absolute quality. Data on mobility and salaries show, on the contrary, substantial positive effects of quantity, independent of quality. We test various explanations for the differences between the determinants of reputation and salary.
I. Introduction
ics on the formation of reputation, both of nd of the groups to which they belong. Most of the research has been purely theoretical, with an much of the work 6). Another ndividuals' behavior vices they produce)
n (Sarafidis, 2007) .
ople in general," is something that develops over time in the minds of those who are judging the person, group, product, etc. e that one party's behavior does not respond to the tation, we can even infer the structure of preferences for reputation or the reputation-enhancing productivity of various characteristics.
There has been a substantial literature in econom individuals a analysis of reputation of firms (good-will) as an asset (Tadelis, 2002) and with focused on reputation arising from behavior in repeated games (Mailath and Samuelson, 200 strand of theory has focused on timing, including the dynamics of the relation of i and reputations and those of the firms for which they work (or the products or ser (Tirole, 1996) , and on the reputation-maximizing timing of the release of informatio Presumably reputation, defined as "overall quality or character as seen or judged by pe
Because reputation is based on perceptions of "overall quality," the approp would seem to be what we mean by quality-what aspects of individuals' behavior c and thus generate their reputations and those of the groups to which they belo construction of reputation might be thought of as analogous to an implicit market in which bu aspects of a good or service are traded for some overall price (Rosen, 1974) .
characteristics brings them to a market, where "purchasers" (employers; the public peers; one's fellow employees; one's neighbors; one's customers) express their prefe weights to the suppliers' efforts. These weights in turn combine in the purchasers' vi created by buyers' preferences and the ability of existing and potential supplier determinants. We can always measure the market "prices" of the dimensions of qu identify the separate behavior of each party, or assum returns to various determinants of repu 1 Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, June 5, 2008.
In this study we illustrate the notion of the implicit market for reputation with the example of the determinants of the reputations of academic economists. Our particular focus is on how the market values both the quantity of their scholarly output and, in the spirit of the hedonic markets literature, various oes the quantity of ew extremely welln terms of its total inants of reputation the essional reputation, sions of reputation-
II. Thinking about Reputation
as they observe the tation is related to in the minds of the may be informative additional uality, however, the s better enhanced by a given number of stimuli of one ite A fundamental work in the general area of memory (Tulving and Thomson, 1973 ) demonstrated its erlying exposure to ine how memories uestion, but part of ber better if they are stimulated by exact repetition of an event rather than by variations in it. Starns and Hicks (2005) show that providing related stimuli at the same time has complementary effects on memories of each, but aspects of the quality of their output. The more specific questions are: 1) How d publications affect the regard in which a scholar is held by other scholars? 2) Do a f regarded publications have the same reputational effect as an equally successful (i impact on other scholars) publication list that is more diffuse? and 3) Are the determ the same as the determinants of pecuniary returns? The answers to these specific questions about rewards to scholars should shed some light on the general determinants of prof especially about how its formation is affected by the trade-offs along various dimen enhancing activities, as well as on the pecuniary returns to reputation.
Our question asks how reputation is formed-what goes on in buyers' minds
outcomes of suppliers' efforts that might generate reputations. Presumably repu memory and how the actions and sequences of suppliers' behavior produce memories buyers. As such, the literature on memory and learning in experimental psychology for our purposes. That literature unsurprisingly makes it clear that memory is enhanced by exposure. In terms of our question about the trade-offs among the dimensions of q issue is whether memory of an item within a class i m in that class or of several different items in the same class.
complexities and proposed a theory of "encoding specificity"-that the specifics und events and the keys that might lead to the retrieval of memory interact to determ develop. This study led to a huge literature, none of which speaks directly to our q which may shed some light on it. Arnold and Lindsay (2002) imply that people will remem that this is only true if the stimuli are provided in the same experimental session. In a slightly different context, that of studying for tests, the results of Kurtz and Loewenstein (2007) show qualitatively similar results. Overall one might infer that these experiments support the notion that memory will be more entire oeuvre by other scholars, and q , the recognition of his/her n -most recognized publication (where l work). 3 We assume that the members of a scholar's profession consider his/her outputs in creating their estimates of the scholar's reputation.
r reputation as a function of these characteristics: strongly enhanced by repetitions of the same stimulus than by the same number of different, but stimuli. Viewing the class of stimuli as all references to a scholar's work, and each in a reference to a particular study, they suggest that scholarly reputation may be more st very important publication than by an equally-visible series of lesser works.
While there are many human endeavors in which mu determining rewards, there has heretofore been no direct analysis of the relativ measures of quality. An area in which one might examine such effects is in sports, wi having been carried out on major league baseball. While no studies have focuse Faurot and McAllister (1992) find a negative effect of a player's home runs on arbitra once runs created are held constant; Kahn's (1993) estimates of salary determination additional effects of extra-base hits on salary among white batters. At least in the ende baseball, a second dimension of quality does not appear to generate additional rewards be y overall quality.
The particular issue is how the market for reputation, R, is affected by th production: Quantity, and two types of quality. 2 In the example of academic re quantity as the number of publications, Q. We define quality as q 1 , the total recogn 2n th n is some arbitrary small number, with n=1 in most of our empirica Buyers thus have some demand fo 2 Obviously, we could generalize this to additional dimensions of quality; but the formulation we use is the simplest that allows us to construct empirical analogues. (3) R = R(Q, q , q ), with R ≥ 0 for all j.
institutions that are ed with a staff that has higher Q, q 1 and q 2n . There is no reason to assume that the R D i are homothetic, so that an interesting empirical exercise would examine how the returns to these determinants of reputation vary with the total dimensions of scholarly work.
The identity of the "buyers" of reputation varies with the example. Certainly definition, "people in g ine and probably does not care about the reputations of individual scholars. Also, within the scholarly community some members undoubtedly have a greater influence in contributi about reputation than others. Because of the difficulties in identifying members determine reputation, we base our example on a wide variety of measures of reputatio be the individual's professional peers, his/her professional organization, some p By analogy, the scholars whose reputations are determined in this market g activities that will maximize their reputations, conditional on their abilities, by respo returns to quantity and the quality dimensions. Their activities will produce an reputational supply functions, one by each of the scholar/participants in this reputational market:
with the R S kj ≥ 0 for all j. The responses in (2) show the reputational returns to an in aspects of a scholar's efforts. As is usual in hedonic models, togethe interact to generate a market reward fun
The buyers i presumably differ in their ability to purchase reputation-those richer will be able to buy more reputation, and in general will presumably be observ resources available to the buyers to purchase reputation. 4 Our empirical work provides some evidence on this issue.
Whether there is any substitution in scholars' production of reputation and whether the supply Rosen, 1987; Basu, 1989 , and, by analogy, the literature on the worker-managed firm functio rogeneity is implicit in (2), but we also assume that the total amount of effort d
reputation is fixed to the individual, or at least that individuals' production functions, homothetic. Even within this assumption, if the returns to particular dimensions of scholars aware of this? If they are aware, are they capable of substituting toward m dimensions-is the market output of reputation really jointly determined by demande may be that each scholar has a Leontief-type production function in these inputs into clearly individual production functions may differ), so that no supply-side substitutio
III. Testing the Determinants of Reputation-Measuring Inpu

A. General Is
Ideally we would have measures of individuals' reputations or of some resu that they have established. One approach is based on the notion that some of the purchasers of reputation are one's peers, so that awards conferred by peers represent their assessments of a scholar' second, indirect approach assumes that the members of an academic collective (depar diminishing its reputation. To achieve this goal they only add those marginal members whose individual reputations are at least as high as some summary measure of the reputations of the 4 This view of buyers seeking to purchase reputation based on their resources predicts the u scholars attached to richer schools will have greater reputations. This outcome arises not beca reputation on the scholar, but rather becaus nsurprising result that use the school confers e it can "purchase" the services of those scholars who are capable of generating greater reputations, which are then conferred onto the institution. This approach has the interesting prediction that, where there is greater heterogeneity in institutional resources, we should observe a steeper gradient across institutions in the extent of scholarly reputation. This prediction seems supported by work of Cardoso et al (2008) showing that the research success of younger American labor economists varies more with the source of their doctorate than does that of their European counterparts. going back to Ward, 1958 This provides a sample of 1339 scholars. While this sample is obviously selected-its members had to tations to be included in this fairly elite group of institutions-there is presumably enough variation in reputation across the 88 departments that selectivity bias is not solely deemed by more senior members of the collective to be sufficiently high that the collective would not reduce its reputation.
One might argue that salary or compensation is a result of scholarly rep analyzed in the same way as the indicators departments and the universities of which they are constituents attempt to maximize reputation, one m expect that the inputs that affect reputation will affect salaries in similar ways. Inde exists on the role of the quantity and quality of publications in salary determination citations by other scholars often being the proxy for quality (Hamermesh et al, 1982;  institutions) and with counts of articles and books proxying quantity. This literature measuring the impacts of these indicators on an outcome of reputation. laries. One institution tem, the data were for ossible to determine if the faculty member was on a 9-month appointment, and rted for 2006-07 at 8 Most of the data were for 2007-08, but where they were not we used 1.04 (2007-t) to inflate sa only had salary data for 2004-05, while for many, particularly the University of California sys 2006-07. In some cases it was imp those cases were not included in the analysis. 9 Sixteen of the schools included here comprise the biennial survey of salaries repo http://www.eco.utexas.edu/faculty/Hamermesh/EcSalsPublicCleaned.xls . The correlation of the average salaries computed for each school and the averages provided there is 0.89, suggesting relatively little systematic cluding citations from ors; but the errors are of the alphabet) the Arts and Humanities o sources was 0.993. tations, including self-citations. To examine this potential problem we took another random sample of 50 and computed the correlation of total citations and total citations without selfcient was 0.991. We cluding self-citations, ing total citations and citations to individual works. One should stress, however, that Q, and thus the publications that could be cited, excludes books and working papers. The former exclusion is not important for most economists, and the latter exclusion matters little in a sample of full professors. The alternative use of the SSCI would be based on authors rather than publications, but the SSCI does not allow a convenient tabulation of a scholar's most-cited works by this method. An alternative would be to use Google Scholar or SCOPUS, but their methods of tabulation are less clear. measurement error in our compilation of salary data.
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One might be concerned that excluding publications that are in science journals, and also ex science journals, might bias our results. It is obviously true that this exclusion generates err clearly small-in a random sample of 50 observations (chosen from a consecutive section correlation between citations in the SSCI and total citations in the SSCI, Science Citation and Indexes together was 0.979, while that between citations to the most-cited paper from the tw One might also be worried that we count all ci citations. The Pearsonian correlation coefficient was 0.984, while the rank correlation coeffi thus do not view this as a problem. (In any case, while it is easy to obtain total citations ex obtaining q 2n excluding self-citations is not feasible.) 11 This choice seems the best among the possible ways of count
The dimensions of quality are represented by citations, with q 1 proxied by the total citations to a scholar's works that are included in Q, and q 2n being the numbers of citations to the scholar's n'th most-cited work, n=1,…, 5.
12 Obtaining information for those whose names are unique (like the authors of this paper) is e measured market y be correlated with Q or one of the q. We The other measures account for individual characteristics that may affect th prices of the determinants of reputation because they ma include the year of the author's first publication listed in the SSCI to measure the ti construct a reputation, always in quadratic form. The gender of the scholar may b quality, since some have argued (Ferber, 1986 ) that same-sex citation is a common others (Hamermesh and Schmidt, 2003) fail to find any disparate outcomes in rec and Yariv, 2006) have shown that those whose names are earlier in the alphabet te certain aspects of scholarly work. We used on-line vitae to generate a measure of received his/her undergraduate education at an English-language university, on the gro to the U.S. from the upper tail of the ability distribution might occur (Borjas, 1987) correlated with the quantity and quality measures. Finally, we created an indicator for an published an article in the sub-field of theoretical econometrics. Most of the results these controls, but including variables that can ge publication-based ranking (again, 1 is highest) has a mean well below the average
IV. Descriptive Statistics
12
The results of Cole and Cole (1973) make it clear that concerns that citations might measu fame ar re infamy rather than e misplaced.
partly because higher-ranked departments are larger, partly because American economics departments 
V. Estimating the Impact of Quantity and Qualities on Reputation
A. Reputation Reflected in Awards
The first three columns of re those in Column ut is that the number ways.
can conclude that t add to these proxies for academic distinction and may diminish it, conditional on the qual There is some evidence in Table 3 that both dimensions of quality generate reputation, as proxied tically significant in the probability of receiving mns present estimates of the determinants of having been elected a Fellow
Society. In addition to the results displayed in the table, the probits describing Honor for alphabetical location, location of undergraduate education, a quadratic in the year the scholar's first SSCI-indexed paper appeared, while the probits for election as Fellow add the indicator for fem these. 14 Place in the alphabet never has a significant effect on receipt of one of these significant effect on any of the reputational measures discussed in this Section), no surprisingly, being Honored is substantially more likely among authors whose fi inputs into reputa
The results presented in Column (4) are similar to those in Column (1), as a (5) to Column (2), and in Column (6) to Column (3). The first point to note througho of entries, Q, never has a significant positive impact on reputation as measured in these two
Conditional on quality, having produced a lot of material adds nothing to reputation. Indeed, the effect on
Fellow is negative and significant in all three specifications. At the very least we quantity does no ity of the work. The indicator for female is not included in these probits, because only one woman has been this measure.
honored according to 15 One might be concerned that we measure from the stock of existing Fellows, not from th flow of newly-elected Fellows. To do that would require obtaining information on Fellows at the time they were elected, which is difficult but possible. Fatally, however, it would require information on those who were never elected, most of whom were never on the Fellows ballot. While using the stock may introduce errors, there is no reason for them to be generating biases that lead these results to mirror those for all the other measures of reputation discussed in this Section. e the equations for Honored, and insignificant in the equations for Fellow. There is also evidence that the marginal payoff to additional citations in total, or to the author's most-cited work, is diminishing: Adding quadratic terms to these probits, as shown in Columns (2) individual is affiliated is related to the quantity and quality measures that we believe may determine predict the receipt of these awards.
Also intriguing in Table 3 are the changes in the estimates that occur when except for the Nobel Prize, easure q were smaller, some American economist would have his/her reputation acknowledged by receipt of one of the AEA awards; and while it is not necessar imagine that current Econometric Society Fellows, of whom half are Americans, wou many of their American peers. Columns (3) and (6) are identical to Columns (1) and citations, citations to the most-cited paper and number of publications are replaced b
indicates that higher quality or quantity increases the likelihood of the outcome that r reputation. In the case of Honored the equation does not fit as well as the quadratic v better than in Column (1). The ability to predict receipt of election as Fellow is, ho enhanced. 17 These results suggest that the market for reputation, at least as proxied by be more like a tournament success (Lazear and Rosen, 1981) .
ndividual Reputation Reflected by Departmental Reputation
In this sub-section we examine how the reputation of the economics departm 16 We do not use the h-index (Hirsch, 2005) . (Ranking an author's papers in descending order of their citation counts, tions. An h-index of as the problems that it uld be used here, but red impact would be difficult. 17 The equations in Columns (1)- (3) were re-estimated defining the outcome to exclude receipt of the Clark Medal. The results were very similar to those presented in the Table. Similarly, none of the conclusions here or anywhere else in this study changes qualitatively if we estimate bivariate relationships between a reputational outcome and each of the quality and quantity measures singly. an author's h-value indexes the paper that is ranked h'th in the order and that receives h cita around 35 is typical for Nobel laureates in economics.) For analytical purposes this measure h combines quantity and quality and also fails to indicate dispersion in quality. No doubt it co interpreting the meaning of any measu reputation. We have argued that the market for scholars makes the reputation of one's department a proxy for one's own reputation and thus a reflection of the roles of quantity and quality of research in generating reputation. In order to maintain the assumption that a department of a given reputation is departments with at part in establishing . This reduces the the reputations of their depa in the table, are the ne of the last three size, the number of full professors in a department is held constant and is unsurprisingly highly significant in increasing a tion.
(4) of Table 3 . We and thus that all the important and may st partly an artifact s who become full professors earlier tend to be associated with schools with higher reputations. This outcome may result from higher-ranked schools having sufficient resources to buy an option by gambling on very promising "purchasing" scholars' attributes, we arbitrarily restrict the samples in this section to least 10 full professors (so that presumably an individual's reputation has only a small the reputation of the collective and problems of reverse causation are minimized) number of observations from 1339 to 1188 (and the number of departments to 66).
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The determinants of the scholarly reputations of the scholars (proxied by rtments) are presented in Table 4 . Included in all the equations, but not shown effects of experience, alphabetical position, being an econometrician and gender. No came close to statistical significance in any of the estimates. Given the importance of department's reputa
Columns (1) and (5) present results analogous to those in Columns (1) and again treat the publication ranking so that a higher number indicates a higher rank, independent variables with positive (negative) coefficients indicate an improvement in the rankings. In non-tabulated estimates younger authors (those whose first papers are more recent) are associated with departments with higher reputational rankings. Holding this measure constant may be reflect the crucial nature of one's first publication (Siow, 1991) ; but the result is at lea of the sample selection criterion we have used-full professors. Those scholar 19 younger researchers.
The crucial results in this sub-section hardly change if we restrict the sub-sample to the 940 scholars located in the 44 departments with at least 15 full professors, or if we include all 1339 observations.
19
Dropping this measure from the regression hardly changes the results: The coefficient on q 1 becomes 0.511, that on q 21 becomes 0.945, and that on Q becomes -4.882.
Having been educated in an English-speaking country (for the overwhelming majority of the sample this is the U.S.) is associated with being at an institution with a lower reputation.
20 This is similar to the results for election as Fellow, although having been educated abroad had no impact on being self-selection graduate students d institutions to hire re and is concerned cted in awards, at the very least here too Q has no impact.
The ad the scholar to be utation from having one's scholarly recognition concentrated more heavily on one work-q has no effect on the USNWR we allow for non-2) and (6) As with the results on reputation refle estimates in Columns (1) and (5) of Table 4 show, however, that increases in q 1 le located in a higher-ranked department. There is no extra fillip to these proxies for rep 21 rating and an insignificant positive effect on the publication-based ranking. When constant marginal returns to the quality measures, in the estimates shown in Column ( that there are diminishing returns to quality along both dimensions. Moreover, both terms along the overall quality dimension are statistically significant, but the quadratic in q for the publication-based ranking. Implicitly, the results demonstrate that higher-ranked depart concerned with the overall quality of publications, as measured by the author's total r scholars, and possibly too by the disti any attention to the quantity of publications.
between a scholar's rank along some quality dimension and his/her reputation, department with which s/he is affiliated. Departments and universities are, howe aspects to the market for individuals' reputations, as reflected in the ranking of their departments. To
20
There may be a distinction between those educated on the Indian sub-continent and those educated elsewhere, perhaps due to differential discrimination, perhaps to differential familiarity with English. We added an indicator for Indians and Pakistanis, but its effect was tiny and statistically insignificant.
examine this possibility we re-estimated the basic equation, again proxying Q, q 1 and q 21 by the scholar's rank in the sample along the criteria of number of publications, total citations and citations to his/her most-cited work. Comparing the results, presented in Column (3) and (7) in Columns (4) and (8) of Table 4. 21 As in Columns (3) and (7), only the scholar's ranking in total citations has a significant effect on the proxies for reputation. There is no evidence of a significant additional impact of either the (1) and (2), or (5) and (6), it is clear that a scholar's rank along all three dimensions on his/her reputation than do the cardinal measures. While not explicitly a tournament for reputation, the results also suggest that the market for scholarly reputation has tournament-like chara dimension of quality. In this formulation, however, q is not important-only total cita
Moreover, the impact of one's rank in Q on both proxies for reputation is significantl reputations that their departments confer on the more prolific scholars are lower than scholars whose work has achieved the same recognition.
One might be concerned about a cogent given that the top eight departments in both the publication-based rankin ratings are in private institutions. There is in fact very little difference in the effects of the two proxies for reputation between the two types of institution. Separate estimate public (private) schools yield estimates of the effects of q , q and Q as 6.264 (6.080), -7.
-2.995 (-1.796) respectively. For Column (7) similar re-estimates yield 0.564 (1.036 and -0.0071 (-0.0416). Tests of equality of the estimates across the equations fail to r that the structures are the same. This similarity should not really be surprisingmobility between tenured
We can expand the quality ranking measures to use both q 21 and q 22 , as shown 21 The simple correlation between the numerical proxies for these quality measures is 0.82.
most-or second-most-cited paper. What matters for reputation is the overall quality of the works that an author has produced.
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Relying on the formulations in Columns (3) and (7), we examine how the proxies for reputation antity and quality at different levels of the publication-ranking and the USNWR rating. USNWR ratings. The absence of important differences at the quantiles suggests that th
While the effects of total quality and quantity have statistically significant (in effects on these proxies for reputation, the sizes of the effects are at least as im distributions in Table 2 and the estimates in Columns (3) and (7) of Table 4 , we can c 95 ) percentile of q 1 increases the ranking by 42 (75). Using the USNWR ratings, the same change generate effects of 0.62 (1.11) on the rating. The inter-quartile change thus increa proxies by about 2/3 of a standard deviation, while a change from the 5 th to the 95 move one's reputation from near the middle to near the top of the range. Increase publication ranking, -0.15 (-0.27) in the USNWR rating.
In Section II we argued that our estimates are tracing out the hedonic locu
produce. To what extent can we e
The partial correlation coefficient between q 1 and the vector q 21 through q 25 is 0. 974, making it difficult to move beyond the estimates presented in Column (4). An additional way of examining the roles of quantity and quality in generat schools' reputational ratings is to study the quality of the department into which new hired between 1993 and 2007. We assume here that the decision to hire a new full pr outside or by granting tenure to an untenured professor, reflects decision-makers' beliefs that the person will add to the reputation of the department (his/her reputation is at least that of the collective' without him/her). Accordingly, a lower-bo epartment some time shortly before s/he joined it Table 5 shows the distribution and some statistics describing the 308 sam promoted internally; of the other 60 percent, nearly one-third w non-U.S. institutions or from outside academe. Of the remaining 40 percent, from schools that were lower in the publication ranking than their current position.
For the scholars in our sample who moved between schools from 1993 to 20 quality rating of the school in 1993. Thus relating the 1993 NRC rating to the individuals' efforts is an even cleaner measure of the impact of the quantity and quality inputs on reputation than those used in the previous sub-section, under the maintained assumption that schools will not hire or tenure scholars who other measures of tion as proxies for the lower bound on the scholar's reputation, using rankings of the quality measures. Also his Section, merely es one's reputation. The estimates are shown in Table 6 . As in all the estimates based on departmental reputa and quantity inputs describes the determinants of reputation better than cardinal as before, there is a negative relationship between this proxy for reputation and the scholar's ranking in the distribution of Q. As with all the other measures that we have examined in t writing more papers, conditional on the overall quality of one's work, generally reduc
As the results in Columns (1)- (3) show, only q significantly increases what we ha proxies for reputation, the marginal effect of additional quality is diminishing; and, a q 21 has essentially no effect on rep
VI. The Non-Reputational Returns to Quality an
A. The Impact on Mobilit
Assuming as we have that universities seek to maximize their reputations through the reputations of their faculty, one would expect that we would observe the same effects of our measures of quantity on the payoffs that universities offer to attract and/or retain faculty. Thus w the impact of these measures on the likelihood that an individual whose first publicat could have moved with t sion in the sub-sample by this criterion, in 2007 20 percent were at department one that employed them in 1992.
In Table 7 we report the results of estimating probits describing whether one move is unsurprising: The foreign-born presumably are earlier in the process of searching for a good job and/or geographic match. As in the estimates of its effect on the various proxies for reputation, greater general quality makes mobility more likely; and having one's scholarly recognition concentrated on one tively related to the one has generated. This result may merely reflect the fact that movers are a doubl ment that either because they other explanations, l outcomes. reputations and the determinants of individuals' non-reputational returns, we examine the salary data that study has no significant impact.
The crucial difference here is that the probability of moving is strongly posi number of publications y selected sample: While they have to meet at least the reputational median of the depart hires them, other scholars may have at least as high a reputation but reject mobility, reject formal job offers or because it is known that they do not seek them. There are and we consider them in the general context of additional evidence on non-reputationa
Of the 308 faculty who moved or were newly tenured, Table 5 showed and the range of mobility was huge. The question is how the quality and quantity m size of the change in the quality of the department with which the scholar was affilia set of 130 rank-changers into those who improved by at least 10 ranks, those whose ra marginally, and those whose ranking fell by at least 10, and present estimates of the ordered probits describing this outcome in Column (1) of Table 8 . None of the para ificant, although Q approaches significance and is surprisingly positive.
Additional evidence on this is provided by the probits in Columns (2) and (3 defines an indicator equaling 1 if the person's ranking improved by at least 10, th on q 1 or q 21 is statistically significant; but the impact of Q for those whose position statistically significa rmined chiefly not by quality but by the sheer volume of output. Unlike its impact on reputation, which for some of the proxies was positive, as in the results in the previous sub-section there is no significant additional effect of citations to the author's most-cited to have less of an effect on salary than citations to the scholar's other work.
B. The Impacts on Salary
q 21 on salary to their impacts on reputation.
We stress that the observations that we use in this sub-section are not a r Unsurprisingly, since public univer citations in total (median of 250 compared to 310 in Table 2 ), fewer citations to th paper (median of 57 compared to 71), but nearly the same number of papers (median of 22 com 24). 23 Moreover, we could not obtain salary information on 10 of the 53 public institu and those individuals on whom we have usable salary and citations data have statisti lower averages of Q, q and q than those public-university faculty members on wh
Regressions of the logarithms of nine-month salaries against the same comb and publications measures used in the previous sections are shown in Columns (1) While the vector of fixed effects is highly significant statistically, its inclusion changes none of the inferences about the impacts of the citations and publication measures on salary. The results are also qualitatively nearly identical if we replace the school fixed effects with the departmental rankings, or the departmental ratings, used in the previous section; and the correlation of ranking (rating) with average salary is 0.80 (0.84).
Moreover, unlike the results on direct measures of reputation, but like that on the probability of moving and the quality of the move, and as shown in some studies of academic salaries, Q has a positive and statistically significant effect on salary. The effect is moderate: Going from the 25 th to the 75 th (5 th to the th ast to the results on 5 th percentiles (not of salaries.
ub-sample differs along qualit umns (4)- (6) of Table 4 , here using e impacts of Q and ly not that different from those for the entire sample. The estimated impacts of the quality and quantity measures on the entire sample.
least quite different put ion.
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Although some of their determinants are the same, clearly reputation does not translate directly to n (3) ersities pay off on not raise and may xplanation for this remarkable difference: 1) The information available to those who determine salaries differs from that 95 ) percentile of Q increases salary by 6 (10) percent), but it stands in sharp contr reputation itself in this study. Estimates of these effects at the 25 th , median and 7 presented) show that the effects are quite similar at different points of the distribution One might be concerned that the results on salary arise simply because the s y dimensions from the overall sample. To examine this possibility, in Col Table 9 we re-estimate the equations in Columns (6) of Table 3 and (3) and (7) of only the sub-sample of public university faculty on whom we have salary data. 25 Th q 1 on Fellow are smaller in absolute value in this sub-sample, but they are qualitative departmental rankings and ratings are nearly identical in this sub-sample to those in
Overall the results suggest that the effect of Q on an individual's salary is at the very from its effects on various proxies for his/her re at salary nor can they be equated (Moore et al, 2001) . The contrast between the effects of Q in Colum and in Columns (4)- (6) These results are not a matter of somehow different salary determination for younger and Re-estimating the specification in Column (3) on the large majority of the sample who re before 1987 hardly changes the results. Similarl re Fellows. older full professors. ceived their doctorate y, interacting experience with the quantity and quality measures adds nothing to the estimates in Column (3). Nor are salaries lower, other things equal, as a compensating differential for those who have better reputations: For those scholars for whom Fellow = 1, in re-estimates of Column (3) salaries are a significant 10 percent higher, other things equal; but the qualitative impacts of Q, q 1 and q 21 are unchanged. No doubt suppliers trade off honorifics for pecuniary returns in compensation packages (see Besley and Ghatak, 2008) , but their honorifics are also rewarded by the market. available to the demanders of reputation generally; and 2) There are unobservable factors correlated with Q that make scholars who produce a lot of output more productive in ways that do not affect or even lower their external reputations. ty is that those who ware of citation information or do not take it into account, so that Q provides the correlated). As one all 43 departments, partments, covering on annual citations.
The contrast between the results on salary and reputation may therefore simply arise from most schools y-setting.
ion on citations, we n those departments ects 21 to Column (3) of s a t-statistic above tion term separately en salaries are determined, having that information available does not seem to alter the effects of the determinants of salaries.
iffer across the 43 institutions, with salary-setting in departments that are part of relatively homogeneous colleges paying ologies and internal
We can test various explanations under the first general rubric. One possibili determine salaries are una only signal of productivity (remember that Q and the q measures are positively effort to examine this possibility, we surveyed individuals in the departments used in this sub-section, obtaining data on whether information on recent accepted/published work, and/or recent citations, is collected for use in determining annual salary changes. 27 We obtained responses from with the unsurprising result that all obtain information on publications; but only 8 de 126 of the 564 individuals included in the estimates in Table 9 , obtain information ignoring citation information in salar
If these results stem from the failure of most institutions to obtain informat would expect to see that the number of publications affects salary determination less i that do collect citations data, while total citations and citations to the most-cited paper have greater eff there. Adding interactions of an indicator for collecting citations data with Q, q 1 and q Table 9 , as shown in Column (1) of Table 10 , we find that none of the interactions ha one, and the vector of interactions is statistically insignificant. Entering each interac does not alter the conclusion. While some schools do collect citation data wh A related possibility is that the locus of control of salary-setting may d less attention to Q, since other departments in the unit have similar production techn 27
The e-mail questionnaire was: "In doing annual merit/salary reviews, what information is requested from faculty members in your Department? 1) List of articles accepted and/or published during the year-YES or NO. 2) List or count of citations during the year to published or unpublished work-YES or NO. Please delete the incorrect answer to each of these two questions." systems of evaluation. To examine this possibility we created an indicator for those departments that are part of large general colleges (typically called Arts and Sciences, Liberal Arts, etc.), equaling 1 for 41 percent of the observations used in the estimates in Table 9 Table 10 . Again, non has a t-statistic above one, and the entire vector is insignificant.
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Another explanation may be that the salaries of those who have moved in determined differently from those of stayers (althou the same effects on the probability of moving that we have observed here on salaries), with the determination of movers' salaries being more responsive to Q and less to the quality reduced sample who could have moved from another institution, we interact the ind with the quality and quantity measures, with the results presented in Column (3) of Ta Yet another possibility under this rubric is that salary determination in larger there is a greater likelihood that a colleague is familiar with the quality of one's wor to rely so much on quantity as a signal, is based less heavily on Q. Interacting professors in a department with Q and the two quality indicators, as shown in Colum same insignificant interactions as the previous three re-specifications.
One (perhaps testable) possibility under the second rubric is that the characteristics that lead scholars to churn out many papers are correlated with other generate high salaries and make them more likely to move. Some of the correla energetic or even better teachers, might be more active departmental citizens, and/or l 28 One might also guess that higher-ranked schools pay more attention to total citations, which, major determinant of reputation, and less to Q. Re-estimating the equation in Column (3) of Ta interactions of the departm as we showed, are the ble 9 by adding the ent's ranking (rating) with Q, q 1 and q 21 suggests that this is not the case in this subsample. The interaction terms were insignificant individually and as a group, F(3, 550)=0.92, (F(3, 348)= 0.64).
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The estimates imply that, other things equal, those who had moved earned 14 percent more per year than otherwise identical faculty who had not. This result is consistent with the Ransom's (1993) findings on the relation between academic salaries and job tenure. more stable colleagues. Some might be viewed as undesirable-they might agitate more successfully for Good guys, whose future papers will be cited a lot; and opportunistic guys, who devote their effort to publishing articles that eventually generate few citations. Reputation alone cannot from the opportunistic, because updating wages may not be fully possible when wage downward. In the academic market a disconnect between reputation and salary (Tadelis,2002) .
Alternatively, assume that each supplier of reputation produces along a production function, so that each paper has the same probability of being an importa some are of higher quality than others. Then greater quantity, indicative of more effort (m testable, but it might be an additional explanation for the findings that the quantity of scholarly output per se has negative effects on reputation but positive effects on mobility and salary. The disconnect between the determinants of reputation and the determina merely result from a difference in goals between agents on the demand-side of reput those university official who set salaries. Assuming, however, that the goals of achieved by enhancing their reputation rather than by paying for characteristics that do not enhance the quantity of publications would be a sensible approach. One would think that, with the recognition of this disconnect, we would see markets working to remove these differences at the margin. mutandis be analyzed using essentially the same methods that we have used here reputation in artistic/creative activities is similar enough to that in academic discipline it using approaches like the one here worth pursuing. Also, the reputations of resta establishment of reputation as stemming from market interactions, and that the vari reputation can be analyzed in a wide variety of real-wo 30 If general managers of major league baseball teams can recognize these profit opportunities, as they seem to have (see Hakes and Sauer, 2006) , one would think that department and university administrators would also be able to do so. .08 0 0.10 *A e current department, and a quadratic in year of first paper (5) and (6). Also included in all equations here and in Table  10 are: Rank in the alphabet, indicators for female, English education and econometrician, and a quadratic in years since the first paper. Columns (5) and (6) also include the number of full professors.
VII. Conclusions
(1) 
